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NOTES
Corporate Borrowing for Investment in
Equity Securities: Tax Advantages via the
Interest Deduction and Dividends Received
Deduction
I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE BENEFIT
Assume that XYZ Corporation earns $1,000,000 before taxes,
that it can borrow at an interest rate of ten percent, and that it
can purchase the preferred stock of a variety of the largest Ameri-
can corporations and so achieve a portfolio with an average divi-
dend yield of ten percent. Under current rates,' XYZ will incur a
tax of $440,750 on its pretax profit of $1,000,000. If, however, XYZ
borrows $1,000,000 and uses this money to purchase a portfolio of
preferred stocks, its tax liability will decrease to $401,650 despite
the fact that preferred dividends are applied directly to pay the
interest on the debt. Thus, XYZ will have reduced its tax liability
by $39,100 without sustaining any other cash flow consequences.
Such a use of borrowed funds to purchase equity securities
produces benefits because of the interplay between sections 163
and 243(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. Under section 163,
the general rule is that all interest on indebtedness paid or accrued
within the taxable year is deductible. The restrictions that apply
to an individual's ability to deduct interest-the requirement of
itemized deductions in excess of the zero bracket amounts and the
limitation upon the deductibility of interest on investment indebt-
edness4-are not imposed on corporations.
Sections 243 through 246 contain the rules governing deduct-
ibility of dividends received by corporations. Whereas individuals
generally are taxed fully on amounts received as dividends,5 corpo-
1. I.R.C. § 11(b).
2. I.R.C. § 163(a). The limitations upon this general rule of interest deductibility ap-
plicable to corporations, including § 267 (related parties) and § 279 (debt-financed corporate
acquisitions), are discussed in Part II, Section B of this Note infra.
3. I.R.C. § 63(c).
4. I.R.C. § 163(d).
5. I.R.C. §§ 301(c), 316. Individuals do receive an exclusion from gross income of $200
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rations can deduct a substantial portion of the dividends they re-
ceive. The general rule is that 85% of dividends received from do-
mestic corporations subject to federal income taxes are deductible
by corporations,' with 100% of the dividends received deductible if
the recipient corporation is a small investment company7 or the
member of an affiliated group with the paying corporation.8 Divi-
dends received on the preferred stock of public utilities are deduct-
ible to a more limited extent if the public utility received the bene-
fits of section 247, whereby a percentage of such dividends paid is
deductible if the utility had taxable income during the year.' At
current rates, 59.13 % of most public utility preferred dividends are
deductible by recipient corporations.10 Dividends received by cor-
porations from foreign corporations are, in general, eligible for the
85% or 100% deduction only to the extent that the dividends are
derived from income that has been subject to the federal income
tax.1
The rationale for the dividends received deduction is that
multiple full taxation of dividends at the corporate level would se-
verely disadvantage the shareholders of the recipient corporation.
Since individuals are the ultimate beneficial owners of all corpora-
tions, the minimization of taxes upon intercorporate distributions
has been deemed vital since the inception of the federal income tax
system.12 Because distributed corporate earnings are taxed at the
($100 prior to January 1, 1981) on dividends received from most domestic corporations.
I.R.C. § 116.
6. I.R.C. § 243(a)(1).
7. I.R.C. § 243(a)(2).
8. I.R.C. § 243(a)(3), (b)(1).
9. I.R.C. §§ 244(a), 247(a).
10. Under I.R.C. § 244, the percentage is derived as 32/46 of the dividend received
times the 85% deduction. See generally Curran, Preferred Stock in Public Utility Fi-
nance-A Reconsideration, FINANcIAL ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 71.
11. More specifically, the foreign corporation must have been engaged in trade or busi-
ness within the United States for at least 36 consecutive months (or the life of the corpora-
tion, if shorter), must have derived at least 50% of its gross income from sources "effectively
connected" with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States, and must not
be a foreign personal holding company. Dividends from such a foreign corporation are then
subject to the dividends received deduction of § 243 to the extent of the proportion that
gross income derived within the United States bears to the gross income of the foreign cor-
poration as a whole. I.R.C. § 245(a).
12. From 1917 to 1935, dividends received by corporations were not subject to federal
income taxation. In 1935 the dividends received deduction was reduced to 90% to discour-
age the use of multiple entities for tax avoidance and to encourage simplification of elabo-
rate corporate structures. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(h), 49 Stat. 1016. The benefit
was lowered to an 85% "credit" in the language of the new Internal Revenue Code passed
the next year. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 26(b), 49 Stat. 1664.
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corporate level and again to the shareholders at their marginal
brackets, s the imposition of an additional full tax each time such
earnings pass between corporate entities has been deemed inequi-
table. This rationale is not weakened by the existence of corpora-
tions that are profitable yet do not pay dividends, for their share-
holders are not receiving the present benefit of those earnings.14
Indeed, the value of an ownership interest in a corporation is often
defined as the present value of the expected stream of distribu-
tions to the individual; 15 the value of the shares of stock in a prof-
itable company currently paying no dividends therefore depends
on the expectation that the firm's reinvestment of earnings will en-
able it to pay much greater dividends in the future (or to dis-
tribute substantial amounts in liquidation). Because under classic
economic theory a corporation's primary goal is the maximization
of the wealth of its shareholders, 6 the corporation should dis-
tribute its earnings to the shareholders-whether corporate or in-
dividual-if the rates of return available to the corporation upon
reinvestment of the earnings are inferior to the rates of return at-
tainable by the shareholders on projects available to them individ-
ually.17 Thus, taxation that inhibits this optimal allocation of capi-
tal by restricting the flow of money in the economy not only is
inequitable to the individual receiving earnings taxed more times
simply because they passed through more entities, but also is con-
trary to public policy.
The legitimate objective of avoiding multiple taxation of earn-
ings at the corporate level, however, leads to a substantial poten-
tial benefit to a corporation if a high-yield stock is merely viewed
as one type of marketable security with a substantial portion of its
return free from federal taxation. The dividends received deduc-
tion primarily seeks to avoid multiple taxation of earnings in the
case of related firms or at least those with a substantial interest in
each other. Obviously, the ownership interest involved when a
13. See generally C. McLuRE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TwicE? (1979); Sur-
rey, Reflections on "Integration" of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L
TAx J. 335 (1975).
14. If the shareholder of such a company wishes to receive current income, he may sell
a portion of his stock and receive capital gains treatment. In doing so, however, he not only
would incur transactions costs, but also would reduce his ownership interest and thus his
claim upon future dividend payments.
15. See F. WESToN & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 553 (5th ed. 1975).
16. See, e.g., R. LPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 170-71, 314-17 (3d ed. 1972); J. WEs-
TON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 15, at 9-13.
17. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 92 (8th ed. 1970).
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small local cannery purchases one thousand shares of A.T. & T. or
Exxon is trivial at best, yet the cannery receives the same divi-
dends received deduction that it would receive if it had invested in
the shares of a local food producer or another cannery.
The potential benefit of pairing the dividends received deduc-
tion with the deductibility of interest on debt used to carry the
equity investment is enormous. At any given time a corporation
may not be able to borrow at some interest rate and receive an
exactly equivalent yield on a diversified portfolio of stable equity
securities, as did the hypothetical XYZ Corporation above.18 Yet
Exhibit 1, which displays the annual averages of the prime rate
charged by banks and the Standard and Poor's index of preferred
stock yields, reveals that there have been numerous occasions since
1950 when preferred yields equalled or exceeded the rate at which
major corporations could borrow.19 The prime rate is only available
to the strongest corporations, and many companies must deal with
debt limitations imposed by indentures or in effect created as the
cost of debt rises with leverage. Nevertheless, the prime rate is
more than a figure at which the most soundly based corporations
can borrow. Combined with margins over prime according to risk,
it also indicates the rates at which other corporations can obtain
debt. Similarly, the preferred stock yield index is valid only as to
the yields available on a limited number of the most stable equity
issues. If there were a large influx of buyers for such securities,
prices would tend to rise substantially (most preferred issues being
rather thinly traded), and available yields would fall correspond-
ingly. Hence, a comparison of the prime rate and the preferred
stock yield index is not indicative of the profit potential for all cor-
porations investing in equity securities with borrowed funds. Such
a comparison is entirely valid only for the hypothetical firm capa-
ble of borrowing the amount it chooses at the prime rate (without
affecting its capital structure) and investing that amount in pre-
ferred stocks of the highest quality (without depressing their
yield).
It is important to recognize, however, that leveraged invest-
ment in equities can be advantageous even if the available divi-
18. See text preceding note 1 supra.
19. Exhibit 1 reveals a trend of increasing volatility, particularly for interest rates.
Data for 1980 indicate a continuation of this trend: while the prime rate has averaged
14.78% for January through September (ranging from 11.00% to 20.00%) the Standard and
Poor's index of preferred stock yields has averaged 10.33% (ranging in monthly averages
from 9.78% to 11.26%).
[Vol. 33:14231426
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dend yield does not equal or exceed the cost of borrowing. Such an
investment will produce a positive net present value to the firm as
long as the dividend yield is greater than 58% of the cost of the
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debt,20 assuming that the borrowing has no other impact upon the
firm. From 1950 through 1979, the Standard and Poor's index of
preferred stock yields was well above 58% of the prime rate
charged by banks in each year, and over the period it averaged
109% of the prime rate.21 Given this prevailing relationship be-
tween prime preferred yields and prime interest rates, many corpo-
rations (not just those that can borrow at the prime rate) could
avail themselves of the benefits of financing high yield equities
with debt. Even in 1979, a year of unprecedented prime rate levels,
the index's preferred stock yield averaged 71.6% of the prime
rate.22 Hence, despite such adverse market conditions, many firms
could theoretically reap the benefits of leveraged investment in eq-
uity securities although transaction costs would probably exceed
benefits for firms not able to borrow at or near the prime rate.
While the dividends received deduction applies to most equity
investments," the benefits of this Internal Revenue Code provision
are greatest with certain types of stock. Preferred stocks are gener-
ally more suitable for corporate investment fund purposes than are
common stocks because they offer greater stability and, in most
cases, higher yields. Preferred stocks also have priority over com-
mon shares as to payment of dividends and as to proceeds of liqui-
dation, and they do not share in the profitability of the firm be-
20. This percentage is derived as follows: the benefit of fully leveraged investment in
equities equals the amount of the dividend less the cost of the debt plus the net tax effect,
which consists of the tax on the 15% of the dividends remaining after the deduction and the
value of the deduction for the interest expense.
B = d(P) - i(P) - [.15(d)(P) - i(P)].46
where B = the benefit
P = the principal amount borrowed and invested
d = the dividend yield
i= the interest rate on the debt
.46 = the maximum corporate tax rate under I.R.C. § 11(b)
B = P[d - i - (.15d - i).46]
= P(d - i - .069d + .46i)
= P(.931d - .54i)
To determine the breakeven point, the amount of the benefit is set equal to zero.
0 = P(.931d - .54i)
.54i = .931d
d/i .54/.931 = 58%
21. See Exhibit 1. Within this period, the averages were 132% for the decade of the
1950s, 95% for the 1960s, and 100% for the 1970s.
22. This relationship, a ratio of the 1979 average preferred yield of 9.07% and the
1979 average prime rate of 12.67%, represents the smallest percentage during the years cov-
ered. The previous low was 76.2% in 1974. The 1979 trend has thus far continued in 1980.
See note 19 supra.
23. See notes 5-11 supra and accompanying text.
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yond the scheduled dividend payments. Therefore, values of
preferred shares that are nonparticipating and nonconvertible
move primarily according to changes in interest rates. Changes in
investor perceptions of the issuing corporation tend not to affect
the value of such shares unless those perceptions touch upon the
ability of the firm to pay the preferred dividends or the likelihood
of insolvency. When a corporate investor purchases publicly traded
equity securities, it seeks to minimize the price variations associ-
ated with the performances of individual firms unless it has what it
believes to be advantageous knowledge about a specific company.
Therefore, the equities purchased not only are likely to be pre-
ferred stock, but also will probably consist of a diversified portfolio
to reduce the risk of the insolvency of any particular firm.
Corporations clearly perceive the benefits of investment in eq-
uities under the dividends received deduction. Financial publica-
tions have explained the deduction and its effective use and have
noted the increasing dominance of corporate investors in the mar-
ket for "straight" preferred stock.2' In particular, financial manag-
ers have tended increasingly to utilize preferred stock in their large
short-term investment accounts as, in effect, a form of money mar-
ket security;2 5 previously, corporate investment in preferred stock
was largely confined to long-term portfolio investments, such as
those of insurance companies.2 6 The primary difference between
preferred stock investments and standard debt instruments, other
than the difference in taxability of the return, is the absence of a
maturity date on the preferred. This feature renders preferred
stock much more susceptible than debt instruments to fluctuations
in value caused by changes in the prevailing interest rate.2 7 The
24. E.g., Markets and Investments: The Profits in Collecting Preferred Dividends,
Bus. WREK, Oct. 17, 1977, at 118; Preferred Stocks Interest Private and Large Corporate
Investors, MAGAZINE OF WALL STREET, Aug. 29, 1970, at 9; Research Notes: Using Preferred
Securities to Generate Greater Cash Flow, FINANciAL EXEcuTIVE, Dec. 1970, at 10.
25. Fischer & Wilt, Non-Convertible Preferred Stock as a Financing Instrument
1950-1965, 23 J. FINANCE 611, 622-23 (1968); Merjos, Investor's Choice: Preferred Stocks
Have Suddenly Returned to Favor, BARRON's, Nov. 3, 1975, at 5.
26. See Merijos, supra note 25.
27. As the maturity of a debt instrument draws near, the price will inevitably ap-
proach the surrender value, no matter how large the gap between the prevailing interest rate
and the stated rate on the debt. Preferred stocks, lacking such a fixed maturity, will vary in
value in direct relation to prevailing interest rates, much as will the perpetuity form of debt,
unless the preferred has some limiting features such as callability or convertibility or unless
the ultimate factor of value upon liquidation-which can at most equal the par
value-comes into consideration. Thus, pure preferred stock theoretically has the value of a
perpetuity the stated payout divided by the current interest rate. In reality, the paying
firm's solvency is always a consideration; hence, the price of a share of preferred stock dif-
19801 1429
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higher market risk of preferred must be balanced against the tax-
exempt character of a portion of the return according to the inves-
tor's risk-return preference curve in order for the corporate inves-
tor to determine whether particular debt or preferred equity in-
vestments are more desirable. 8
Thus, while corporations definitely are availing themselves of
the dividends received deduction on equities unrelated to their
own lines of business, there is no evidence that corporations are
leveraging fully such equity investments as part of a tax reduction
plan. To the extent that the corporations taking the deduction are
capitalized with a mixture of debt and equity, the equity invest-
ments are in effect partially leveraged. The resulting tax reduction,
however, is incidental.
There are several potential explanations for the apparent fail-
ure by corporations to utilize fully leveraged equity investments.
First, the market risk may well deter a number of corporate
financial managers. As demonstrated above, preferred equity in-
vestments are especially sensitive to interest rate fluctuations" and
tend to lose value more rapidly than debt instruments in a period
of rising interest rates. Given the uncertainty and volatility charac-
terizing interest rates since 1965,30 conservatism on the part of
corporate financial managers is understandable.
Second, corporations may not have been able to tie the financ-
ing debt to the equities in an adequate fashion. Most firms would
not wish to constrain the amount or cost of debt available to
finance corporate purposes in order to undertake investments in
unrelated equities. Hence, corporations would seek to use the eq-
uity investment as collateral for the debt and to arrange the ma-
turity of the debt accordingly. Collateralization probably would not
pose too great a problem, although the lender would likely require
recourse against the corporation because of the market volatility of
the equities. Obtaining debt of sufficient duration for such pur-
poses, however, would pose a more formidable problem. Nominal
application of long-term debt to other projects and use of available
cash to finance the equities would achieve the goal but would risk
fers from the perpetuity value by an amount reflecting the risk the market associates with
the likelihood that the corporation will be liquidated voluntarily or involuntarily and that
an amount less than the par value will be realized by the investors.
28. See Curran, supra note 10, at 74-75.
29. See note 27 supra.
30. See Exhibit 1 supra.
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violation of the accumulated earnings provisions.31 The availability
of bank debt of sufficient length to allow for the weathering of an
interest rate cycle prior to refinancing is questionable. Smaller
firms have perhaps the best opportunity to secure loans of suffi-
cient duration by dealing with individuals, such as major share-
holders, but such firms must guard against running afoul of the
"related parties" or capital structure restrictions on interest
deductibility.32
Last, corporations may be failing to avail themselves of the
benefits of fully leveraged investment in equities because of simple
lack of sophistication and lack of desire for profit maximization. A
preference for conservatism, not necessarily based upon reason,
was noted recently in regard to a similar plan of "dividend roll-
overs" designed to take maximal advantage of the dividends re-
ceived deduction in the context of money balances.33 While fully
leveraged equity investment is not complicated, it is likely that
many corporate financial officers, bound by tradition, have not
even considered it and would not seek to take advantage of such a
strategy, even were it clearly available with substantial benefits,
unless they were aware of its attempted use by a substantial num-
ber of their peers.
II. POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS
The benefits of pairing the interest deduction with the divi-
dends received deduction in a fully leveraged equities investment
plan are not impaired by the provisions of the two deduction sec-
tions themselves; those benefits are in theory of substantial net
present value and should be available to corporations that either
have access to long-term loans from individuals or are agressive
enough to assume the market risk over the term for which institu-
tional lenders are willing to supply the capital. Sections 163 and
243(a)(1) do not exist in a vacuum, however, and corporations are
subject to several other tax provisions that either limit the applica-
31. See text accompanying notes 40-43 infra.
32. See text accompanying notes 57-67 infra.
33. Markets and Investments, supra note 24. These dividend rollovers involve buying
preferred stock shortly before the ex-dividend date and selling it soon thereafter. (Certain
lags are necessary to prevent technical corrections from negating the benefits.) The process
is then repeated with another stock that is approaching its ex-dividend date. Some financial
officers regarded the plan as too wild ("too much swinging for me"); others expressed a
desire that it not become widely understood in order to keep the benefits for themselves
("we've got a good thing going"). Id. at 119-20.
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bility of these sections or interact with them. This section of this
Note investigates these potential limitations by analyzing two pen-
alty taxes on corporations that seek to shield their shareholders
from taxation, by looking at the various limitations on interest de-
ductibility by corporations, and by examining the restrictions
placed upon the dividends received deduction.
A. Corporate Penalty Taxes
1. The Accumulated Earnings Tax
Internal Revenue Code sections 531 through 537 impose a spe-
cial tax on earnings of a corporation that are held in corporate so-
lution but are not required for a corporate purpose. This tax is
designed to penalize corporations that seek to maximize the share-
holders' wealth by retaining earnings and thus avoiding a second
taxation of that income.3 The penalty is so severe 5 that there is
substantial incentive to avoid even the risk of imposition of the
tax. The general rule is couched in terms of "the purpose of avoid-
ing" the income tax at the shareholder level.36 The taxpayer has
the burden of proving the absence of such a purpose if earnings
and profits have been accumulated "beyond the reasonable needs
of the business. '3 7 The tax is generally imposed on the amount by
which undistributed earnings exceed the portion retained for the
reasonable needs of the business, 8 although each corporation is al-
lowed an accumulation of at least $150,000 of earnings and
profits.39
Investment in unrelated equities is one of the standard indica-
tors used by the government to identify corporations that are ac-
cumulating earnings beyond their reasonable needs.40 The focus of
this criterion is the way the purchased stock relates to the "busi-
ness of the corporation."'4 Under the regulations, whether the
34. The theory underlying such a practice is that the substantial earnings will increase
the value of the firm's shares, and the shareholder may reap the benefits of the corporate
profits at capital gains rates when he sells the shares.
35. The tax ranges from 27.5% to 38.5% upon the amount deemed "accumulated tax-
able income." I.R.C. § 531. This penalty tax is imposed in addition to the standard income
tax liability at the corporate and individual levels.
36. I.R.C. § 532(a).
37. I.R.C. § 533(a). The fact that the corporation is a holding or investment company
is prima facie evidence of the forbidden purpose. I.R.C. § 533(b).
38. I.R.C. § 535.
39. I.R.C. § 535(c)(2).
40. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.533-1(a)(2)(ii) (1960), 1.537-3(b) (1960).
41. Tress. Reg. § 1.537-3(b) (1960).
[Vol. 33:14231432
CORPORATE INVESTMENT
ownership of less than 80% of the stock of another corporation
constitutes the use of funds in the business of the owning corpora-
tion, rather than as an investment, "depend[s] upon the particular
circumstances of the case."'42 Decisional authority establishes that,
unless there is some overriding long-range purpose for the accumu-
lation of a liquid reserve, the acquisition of the stocks of public
corporations unrelated to the acquiring corporation, even in a di-
versified portfolio, provides clear evidence of an intent to avoid the
imposition of tax at the shareholder level.43 Based upon these prin-
ciples the purpose of minimization of corporate income taxes, as by
a corporation fully leveraging its equity investments, is not likely
to be treated as an acceptable purpose to allow acquisition of unre-
lated equities as part of the "business of the corporation." Never-
theless, there are several rationales by which a corporation seeking
to benefit from leveraged equity investments can evade the noose
of the accumulated earnings tax.
The strongest argument for not applying the accumulated
earnings tax to corporations that borrow for investment in equity
securities is that the penalty tax provisions challenge the invest-
ment of earnings and profits in unrelated equities. The regulations
state that "investment by a corporation of its earnings and profits
in stock and securities of another corporation is not, of itself, to be
regarded as employment of the earnings and profits in its busi-
ness. ' 44 If the government wished to use ownership of, rather than
investment of earnings and profits in, unrelated equities as an indi-
cator of the forbidden purpose, that distinction could easily have
been accomplished by a different drafting of the regulatidns. As
the regulations now stand, however, there is a clear indication that
tracing of the invested funds back to the status of earnings and
profits is necessary. The need for such tracing has never been ad-
dressed in the reported cases under the unrelated equities criterion
for imposition of the accumulated earnings tax, but the issue of the
source of the funds for the investment has never been raised.4 5 If
42. Id.
43. E.g., Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938); Cataphote Corp. v.
United States, 535 F.2d 1225 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3(b) (1960).
45. Rather, the challenged corporations have litigated under the theory that there was
a valid business purpose for the acquisition of the stock. See, e.g., United States v. Donruss
Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969) (contending that purchase of stock of major distributor was desira-
ble for control purposes); Cataphote Corp. v. United States, 535 F.2d 1225 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
(contending that the investment was part of a contingency fund for possible acquisition of a
fleet of trucks and a service department should the firm's current middleman leasing prac-
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equity investments were fully leveraged, the funds used to
purchase the stock would not be earnings and profits but rather
loan proceeds. Documentation of this nexus between the loan and
the purchase would be quite easy, especially if the loan were collat-
eralized by the equities. While a corporation undertaking this
course of action would still be subject to the restrictions of the ac-
cumulated earnings tax, such an investment, if well documented,
would not in itself lead to liability under this penalty tax provision
as it is now construed.
Other arguments that can be made for the proposition that
leveraged investments in equity securities should not trigger impo-
sition of the accumulated earnings tax stem from the limited appli-
cation of the tax. Although the benefits of leveraged investments
are theoretically available to all corporations subject to the federal
income tax,-" the accumulated earnings tax appears to be applica-
ble only to those corporations that are dominated by a few large
shareholders who can exercise control over the corporate dividend
policy. 47 Also, in order for the accumulated earnings tax to be ap-
plicable, the avoidance of tax at the shareholder level must be one
of the purposes of the accumulation (though it need not be the
sole, dominant, or controlling motive).48 Although tax avoidance is
clearly a dominant motive of fully leveraged equity investments,
such investment activity is directed toward avoidance of the corpo-
rate rather than the individual income tax.
tice become unprofitable).
In GPD, Inc. v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1974), the court did find that the
accumulated earnings tax imposition need not be based on an accumulation of "earnings
and profits" in the taxable year. Id. at 1086-87. The court, however, stressed that two fac-
tom must be present before the tax could be imposed: "1) the proscribed purpose of avoid-
ing the income tax for its shareholders, and 2) the proscribed conduct of permitting earnings
and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." Id. at 1079. Thus, while
it is unnecessary to trace the accumulated earnings to the taxable year under question, it is
necessary to locate an improper accumulation of earnings and profits before the penalty tax
can be imposed.
Note, however, that if the equity securities funded by debt appreciated, the amount of
appreciation would properly be regarded as accumulated earnings and profits for the pur-
poses of imposition of the accumulated earnings tax. See Ivan Allen Co. v. United States,
422 U.S. 617 (1975).
46. In practice, however, large public corporations would probably be unable to obtain
the necessary loans and to purchase enough preferred stock at sufficient yield (given the
limited market depth for such shares) to render such investment activity useful to them.
47. B. BrrrKER & J. EusucE, FEDERAL INcoME TAxATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 8.02, at 8-6 to -7 (4th ed. 1979).
48. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
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2. The Personal Holding Company Tax
The other tax designed to penalize use of the corporate struc-
ture to shield shareholders from full income taxation at the high
individual rates applicable to income not related to personal ser-
vices is the personal holding company tax imposed by sections 541
through 547. If a corporation meets the necessary qualifications of
a personal holding company-the adjusted ordinary gross income
requirement and the stock ownership requirement 9-it will be
subject to a tax amounting to 70% of its "personal holding com-
pany income" (generally, passive income) that is not currently dis-
tributedY' Briefly, under the adjusted ordinary gross income re-
quirement"1 at least 60% of the adjusted ordinary gross income
(gross income excluding gains treated as capital, with certain fur-
ther adjustments relating to passive income)52 must be personal
holding company income, which consists of passive income such as
dividends, rents, and royalties, compensation for the use of corpo-
rate property by shareholders, and income from personal service
contracts. The stock ownership requirement is that at some point
within the last half of the taxable year more than 50% in value of
the outstanding stock of the corporation must have been owned by
five or fewer individuals."
The personal holding company tax relates to fully leveraged
equity investments insofar as receipt of the dividends pushes a cor-
poration over the threshold of the adjusted ordinary gross income
requirement. If a corporation meets the stock ownership test of a
personal holding company, use of fully leveraged equity invest-
ments could trigger imposition of the personal holding company
tax. This potential problem results from the inclusion of the divi-
dends in "adjusted ordinary gross income" as well as "personal
holding company income," neither of which is reduced by the divi-
dends received deduction or the interest deduction.5 5 Ordinarily,
49. I.R.C. § 542(a).
50. I.R.C. § 541. Note that this percentage equals the maximum rate applicable to
individuals under I.R.C. § 1.
51. I.R.C. § 542(a)(1).
52. I.R.C. § 543(b).
53. I.R.C. § 543(a). There are various exceptions and further requirements for most of
the types of passive income. The examination of those provisions, however, is beyond the
scope of this Note. See generally B. B1riKR & J. EusTicE, supra note 47, at 8.22.
54. I.R.C. § 542(a)(2). The ownership attribution rules applicable to this requirement
are located in I.R.C. § 544.
55. Interest expense relating to rents and mineral royalties is deductible in reaching
adjusted ordinary gross income and personal holding company income, but there are no
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fully leveraged equity investments would be made by a firm with
substantial nonpassive taxable income; therefore, the incremental
adjusted ordinary gross income provided by the dividends would
pose no problem. Should the company face a decline in operating
earnings, however, the unaffected dividend receipts, in combina-
tion with any other passive income, could become the dominant
component of the firm's income. There is no "escape hatch" provi-
sion, as in the case of rents and royalties, 8 for a company that
derives a majority of its income from dividend sources. Hence, the
corporation would have to foresee the problem and liquidate a suf-
ficient portion of the equities or else face the rigors of the penalty
tax provision. The option of liquidation might be unpalatable if
the firm's earnings decline has coincided with a general economic
slump, particularly if, as has happened in the past decade, the bus-
iness cycle downturn is accompanied by high interest rates that in
turn depress preferred stock prices. The statutory means of avoid-
ing imposition of the personal holding company tax-distributing
the personal holding company income to the shareholders-would
offer no help to the firm fully leveraging its equity investments be-
cause the income to be distributed-the dividends-would already
be utilized to pay the interest on the debt. Thus, the firm unfortu-
nate enough to have its fully leveraged equity dividends push it
into personal holding company status would be thrust into a thor-
oughly untenable position. This predicament clearly would be a
risk for a corporation with the appropriate stock ownership charac-
teristics to result in personal holding company status, and any
such firm would have to assess that risk carefully in deciding
whether to undertake fully leveraged equity investments.
B. Restrictions on Deductibility of Corporate Interest Expense
1. Related Parties
Interest deductions that arise with respect to related parties,
provided that the interest is accrued rather than paid currently,
are disallowed under Internal Revenue Code section 267.2 Such
relationships include that between a corporation and an individual
who owns more than 50% in value of its outstanding stock,58 and
commensurate provisions for interest expense relating to dividends. I.R.C. §
543(b)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(iii).
56. LR.C. § 543(a)(2).(5).
57. I.R.C. § 267(a)(2).
58. I.R.C. § 267(b)(2). Note that attribution rules apply to the individual's percentage
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that between two corporations, both of which are owned, to the
extent of 50% or more of the value of outstanding stock, by the
same individual. 9 This provision does not affect the fully lever-
aged purchase of equity securities by a corporation as long as the
debt is obtained from unrelated sources. If, however, the corpora-
tion borrows from a related party, as when a close corporation can-
not obtain additional bank debt (or does not wish to tie up its lim-
ited unsubordinated debt capacity for such purposes) and must
turn to members of the controlling family, the company must pay
interest currently ° in order to obtain the full benefits of leveraging
the equity investments.
2. Capital Structure
If a close corporation is financed substantially by debt owed
its shareholders, the government frequently will challenge the
characterization of the investment as debt, arguing instead that it
is part of the corporation's equity capital.6 1 The owners can obtain
significant benefits by characterizing a large portion of their invest-
ment as debt,"' and the government has sought to limit these bene-
fits. In addressing the characterization issue, courts have tended to
look beyond the form of the instrument and instead have gener-
ated several criteria to distinguish between debt and equity capi-
tal." Although Congress chose not to attempt a definition of the
difference between stock and debt in the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code,"' it decided in 1969 to place the burden on the Treasury De-
partment to delineate the distinctions by means of regulations.6
To date, however, these regulations do not exist, even in proposed
of ownership.
59. I.R.C. § 267(b)(3).
60. The corporation must pay the interest to a related party within the taxable year or
two and one half months thereafter in order for it to be deductible. I.R.C. § 267(a)(2)(A).
61. See, e.g., Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1972); Tyler v.
Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1969); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694
(3d Cir. 1968); J.S. Biritz Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1967).
62. See Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical
Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAx L. REv. 369, 371-404 (1971).
63. The primary criteria are as follows: whether there is a pro rata holding of stock
and debt among the shareholders; whether the debt-equity ratio is so high as to run afoul of
the thin corporation doctrine; whether the debt was issued for "essential" assets; and
whether the parties intended an actual debtor-creditor relationship. For a discussion of
these criteria and the cases applying them, see B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 47, at 1
4.04.
64. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
65. I.R:C. § 385.
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form.
The danger of disallowance of interest deductibility because of
recharacterization of debt as equity would not generally arise in
the debt-financed purchase of unrelated equities. Application of
this disallowance presupposes that the loans come from sharehold-
ers of the close corporation. Furthermore, even if the funds derive
from this source, application of the judicial criteria for distinguish-
ing between debt and equity capital may assure characterization of
the capital as debt. First, there is no reason why the loans would
be obtained in a pro rata manner. Second, the loans would not be
for "essential" assets. Last, an actual debtor-creditor relationship
would be intended.6 Hence, only if the loans pushed the debt-eq-
uity ratio to a level regarded as excessive by the courts7 would
there be any apparent danger of disallowance of the interest de-
duction. Segregation of the loan proceeds and direct collateraliza-
tion of the loans with the equities would greatly diminish that risk.
3. Debt-Financed Corporate Acquisitions
In 1969 Congress responded to the wave of corporate acquisi-
tions during the 1960s by limiting the amount of interest any cor-
poration could deduct on certain debt issued to finance such acqui-
sitions.8 8 Under section 279, a corporation acquiring the stock of
another corporation 9 or at least two-thirds of a corporation's pro-
ductive assets70 generally is restricted to $5,000,000 in interest de-
ductions"' on debt used to acquire the stock or assets if three con-
ditions are met: first, the debt is subordinated to the issuing
66. See note 63 supra.
67. Whereas a three to one ratio of debt to equity is generally considered safe, B.
BrrrKR & J. EUSTICE, supra note 47, 1 4.04, at 4-13, courts have accepted much higher
ratios when they have found a valid business purpose for the debt. E.g., Byerlite Corp. v.
Williams, 286 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1960) (advances of over $550,000 from parent to wholly-
owned subsidiary in order to take advantage of exporting opportunity accepted as debt al-
though only $30 of equity capital present); Lots, Inc. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 541 (1968)
("loans" by sole shareholder to his corporation of over $50,000 to finance development of
real estate purchased from him accepted as debt even though only $10,000 of capital had
been contributed); Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 374 (1967) (debt of
roughly $3,500,000 issued in incorporation of established family partnership in rendering
business accepted as debt despite capital being set at $5,000-a debt-equity ratio of approx-
imately 700 to 1).
68. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 411(a), 83 Stat. 604 (enacting I.R.C.
§ 279). See generally Eustice, Corporations and Corporate Investors, 25 TAx L. REv. 509,
512-27 (1970).
69. I.R.C. § 279(b)(1)(A).
70. I.R.C. § 279(b)(1)(B).
71. I.R.C. § 279(a)(1).
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corporation's trade or other secured creditors;72 second, the debt is
convertible (or includes an option to purchase shares);" and third,
the debt is part of the indebtedness of a corporation that fails one
of two leverage tests. 4 There is no minimum percentage test with
respect to the amount of stock acquired, although there is such a
test with respect to the purchase of assets; all stock purchased by a
corporation is covered by the provision. An important limitation,
however, is that the debt will be considered "corporate acquisition
indebtedness" only if the issuing corporation owns before the close
of the taxable year five percent or more of the total voting power
of the company whose stock was purchased. 5
Section 279 would rarely affect the corporation fully leveraging
its equity investments. Only a large corporation heavily investing
in the stock or assets of other corporations would have $5,000,000
in acquisition-related interest. Even such a corporation would still
have to run afoul of each of the three tests of subordination, equity
participation, and leverage in order for its debt to be characterized
as "corporate acquisition indebtedness." Most importantly, the ac-
quisition of a diversified portfolio of preferred stock by a corpora-
tion leveraging its equity investments would virtually guarantee
application of the five percent stock rule. Not only would the di-
versification minimize the chance of owning enough of any single
company's stock to meet the percentage test, but the stock
used-preferred-usually does not carry a vote, so that even a con-
centrated ownership 76 would not exceed the required five percent
of combined voting power of all classes of stock. 7
4. Holding Tax-Exempt Securities
Section 265, which relates to the deductibility of interest paid
in connection with the purchase or continued holding of tax-ex-
empt investments, applies equally to corporations and individuals.
72. I.R.C. § 279(b)(2).
73. I.R.C. § 279(b)(3).
74. These leverage tests are as follows: the corporation must either exceed a two to one
debt-equity ratio or must have projected earnings less than three times its annual interest
expense. I.R.C. § 279(b)(4).
75. I.R.C. § 279(d)(5).
76. Such a concentration could occur if the issuing corporation were using a dividend
rollover strategy in combination with full leverage. See note 33 supra.
77. I.R.C. § 279(d)(5). Although the regulations under this subsection, Trees. Reg. §
1.279-4(b) (1973), do not specifically address the matter, preferred stock with voting rights
contingent on the occurrence of particular events presumably would not be considered part
of the combined voting power unless those triggering events had already occurred.
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No interest deduction is allowed on "indebtedness incurred or con-
tinued to purchase or carry" tax-exempt investments.7 8 A similar
provision applies to indebtedness incurred to refinance the acquisi-
tion of shares of a regulated investment company, the dividends on
which are exempt from federal taxation.79 Income effectively ex-
empt from federal taxation under the dividends received deduction
is not covered by section 265; hence, this provision does not impair
the usefulness of fully leveraged equity investments. The analogy
between interest on debt used to carry tax-exempt securities and
interest paid by a corporation holding fully leveraged equities,
however, is substantial. The ramifications of this analogy, particu-
larly as to the difficulty of applying section 265(2), will be explored
in Part III of this Note.
C. Restrictions on the Dividends Received Deduction
There are no Internal Revenue Code provisions that specifi-
cally restrict a corporation's use of the dividends received deduc-
tion as the four provisions above limit interest deductions by cor-
porations. Section 269, however, allows the government to limit all
deductions relating to certain acquisitions if "the principal purpose
for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of
Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit or
other allowance which [the taxpayer] would not otherwise enjoy.' ' 0
This provision covers a corporation's acquisition of another corpo-
ration's property if the latter firm is not controlled by the acquir-
ing corporation or its shareholders and the acquiring corporation's
basis in the property is determined by reference to the basis in the
hands of the transferor firm.81 Individuals are subject to disallow-
ance of deductions under section 269 if the principal purpose of
their acquisition of a corporation was tax evasion or avoidance.82
While thus far no court has upheld disallowance of the dividends
received deduction under section 269,83 application of that provi-
sion could, in theory, be directed either at the individual who cre-
ated or acquired a corporation in order to avail himself of the divi-
dends received deduction or at the corporation that acquired stock
for the prohibited tax avoidance purpose. While courts have not
78. I.R.C. § 265(2).
79. I.R.C. § 265(4).
80. LR.C. § 269(a).
81. I.R.C. § 269(a)(2).
82. I.R.C. § 269(a).
83. B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 47, 16.21, at 16-38.
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directly questioned the applicability of section 269 to the divi-
dends received deduction, they have avoided application of the
section in this context by closely examining the facts of each case.
Specifically, these courts have allowed the deduction by finding
that tax avoidance was not the overriding purpose of the acquisi-
tion84 or that an alternative structuring of the deal would have
achieved the same tax avoidance result.8 5
The full leveraging of equity investments does not appear
likely to subject the investing corporation to section 269 disallow-
ance of the dividends received deduction. Although the principal
purpose of financing equities with debt is clearly the avoidance of
federal income tax, the property acquired-the stock-would not
have a basis determined by the basis in the hands of a transferor
corporation, as is required for imposition of section 269. Further-
more, assuming that the corporation purchasing the fully leveraged
equities is a profitable, operating business merely seeking to reduce
its tax liability, neither would the corporation's shareholders be
subject to section 269 because of the acquisition-the principal
purpose for the corporation's existence, and hence for the acquisi-
tion of shares in it by individuals, would not be tax avoidance.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE BENEFIT: COMPARISON WITH THE
HOLDING OF TAx-ExEMPT SECURITIES
The corporate taxpayer receives a clear benefit if it can both
receive 85% of dividends free of tax and deduct the interest on the
debt funding the stock. This benefit is quite analogous to the one
that is inhibited by section 265(2)-the deduction of interest on
debt used to carry tax-exempt securities. The rationale for the dif-
ferent treatment accorded the two benefits is that intercorporate
dividends are shifts of earnings (already taxed once to their pro-
ducer) among entities prior to the second taxation at the share-
holder level and thus serve as a method of allocating those earn-
ings to ultimate shareholder beneficiaries. Overuse of this means of
allocation is discouraged by the taxation of 15% of distributions
among nonaffiliated corporations. Tax-exempt securities, on the
other hand, are in general neither claims upon the income of the
payor nor claims upon proceeds previously taxed. Most issuers of
84. Geoli Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 349 (1970); Arutunoff v. Com-
missioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 931 (1963); Commodores Point Terminal Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 11 T.C. 411 (1948).
85. Cromwell Corp. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 313 (1964).
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tax-exempt securities are not themselves taxed, and the securities
are legal claims enforceable regardless of whether the entity can
generate sufficient revenues to fund its payments.
The distinction breaks down from the perspective of a corpo-
ration that seeks maximum return on its liquid reserves. Tax-ex-
empt securities and preferred stocks86 have substantially similar
characteristics from the corporate investor's perspective. Both in-
vestments represent claims on fixed income streams that are im-
paired only when the payor faces severe constraints.87 The values
of both types of instrument vary primarily according to shifts in
the prevailing interest rate, unless the solvency of the payor be-
comes suspect.8 Both types may contain features giving the issuer
the right to call in the security, either at the issuer's option (should
market rates fall substantially below those at which the obligations
were issued) or in accordance with sinking fund requirements.
Also, both types of investment are quite easily marketable, al-
though the market for particular issues is likely to be so shallow
that there will be a significant difference between the bid and
asked prices at any given time. Similarly, block sales of any single
issue probably will require a discount below the current bid price.
Except for any requirements based on the corporation's gross
income,"' the rates of return available to a corporation on pre-
ferred stocks and on tax-exempt securities are directly comparable.
The after-tax rate of return to the corporate investor in tax-ex-
empt securities is simply the market yield, with an adjustment for
any capital gains or losses upon disposition. The comparable rate
of return on preferred stock, unadjusted for any gain or loss upon
disposition, is 93.1% of the market yield.90 Regarding the possibil-
86. The term "preferred stocks" is here limited to large corporations' nonparticipating
and nonconvertible issues lacking callability features that heavily influence their value.
87. Preferred dividends are theoretically payable at the discretion of the board of di-
rectors, but in reality such distributions are reduced only when the scheduled payment
would pose a serious threat to the firm's solvency. This distinction between discretionary
payment of preferred dividends and mandatory payment of interest on debt is further di-
minished if the preferred stock carries a cumulative right to dividends.
88. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
89. Such requirements could originate from external sources such as the Internal Rev-
enue Service or from the corporation's own agreements, such as bond indentures. One re-
quirement with important tax implications involves the definition of the personal holding
company. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
90. This percentage assumes 85% deductibility and the maximum marginal corporate
tax rate:
Dividend - [(Dividend - Deduction) Tax Rate]
Yield = Stock Price
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ity of such gains or losses, changes in the market values of both
types of investment are basically correlated with market interest
rate shifts. There are several other external factors that determine
the relative values of these two types of investment, but the proba-
ble overall impact of these factors is essentially neutral.9 1
To evaluate the market forces that set the prices of these two
investment vehicles, assume that preferred stock P and tax-exempt
security T are equally risky. Financial theory indicates that the
market should then value the two investments so that their after-
tax rates of return are equal. 3 If the annual dividends per share of
P equalled the annual interest per unit of T, the corporate investor
would be indifferent between them if the price of P were 93.1% of
that of T."5 Individual investors, however, have a far different
point of reference for relative valuation, since they would be taxed
fully on the dividends of P.9 Individual investors in the market-
place would tend to bid up the price, and hence drive down the
yield, of T relative to P, making P more attractive to the rational
corporate investor. Hence, any corporate investor willing to
purchase tax-exempt securities should be able to find preferred
stock of equivalent riskiness that will produce a higher return than
tax-exempt securities. It is therefore inconsistent for the govern-
ment to prohibit corporations from improving their rate of return
on tax-exempt securities by leveraging them and deducting the in-
terest while it allows this same technique for preferred stocks,
which already have a higher rate of return to corporations. In both
cases a double benefit is present.
Should Congress determine that there is insufficient reason to
retain the current treatment of interest on debt used to finance
91. Tax-exempt securities are more favorable investments than preferred stock
because they are not dependent on the good will of a board of directors for their return and
often are backed by the taxing power of the state. Preferred stocks are advantageous in that
better information is often available to evaluate the riskiness of the payor and that markets
are more structured. The absence of a maturity date on preferred stocks renders them theo-
retically more volatile than debt obligations. See note 25 supra. This volatility would oper-
ate to the investor's advantage in times of falling interest rates and to his disadvantage
when rates are rising.
92. For discussions of the capital asset pricing model, see STUDiES IN THE THEORY OF
CAPrrAL MARKETs (M. Jensen ed. 1972); F. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 15, at 636-86.
93. Actually this percentage is a bit simplistic; such other factors as the frequency of
periodic payments, the length of time until maturity or recall, and the anticipated proceeds
upon recall or maturity are also determinants of the market value. As long as the maturity
date is distant, however, the effect of these factors is minor and can be disregarded for
purposes of theoretical comparison.
94. This statement ignores for the sake of simplicity the dividend exclusion available
to individuals. See note 5 supra.
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equity investments by corporations, the most obvious means of
limitation would be a provision analogous to section 265(2): "No
deduction shall be allowed for . . [i]nterest on indebtedness in-
curred or continued to purchase or carry stock, the dividends on
which are wholly or partially deductible under sections 243
through 245, to the extent of the deductions provided under those
sections."9 5 Unlike debt used to finance tax-exempt securities, in-
debtedness that funds equity investments can generate interest
expense exceeding the amount of dividends and yet have a very
legitimate nontax motivation. Hence, disallowance of interest de-
ductions in excess of the dividends received deduction would pe-
nalize borrowing for control-related purposes and could even affect
a borrower who received no benefit from the dividends received
deduction."
There may well be a rationale for treating preferred stock dif-
ferently from common stock in this regard; hence, the disallowance
provision discussed above might be made applicable only to pre-
ferred stock. Nonconvertible and nonparticipating preferred stock
is an investment with characteristics quite close to those of long-
term debt instruments: limited appreciation potential, periodic
payments of cash, and preference as to proceeds upon liquidation.
Importantly, preferred shareholders usually do not participate in
the control of the firm; typically they can vote, if at all, only in
some default situation. Common stock is generally a much riskier
investment than preferred stock, and the "upside potential" that
accompanies such greater risk is substantially related to the "abil-
ity to control" element of ownership. There is therefore some ap-
peal in the notion of treating the two types of stock differently
with respect to interest deductibility, but such a distinction would
probably be difficult to apply. There are many hybrid varieties of
equity securities-multiple classes of common, convertible pre-
ferred, participating preferred, voting preferred, and others-and
categorization of these into the two classical equity types would be
nearly impossible. Whether such a stock more closely resembles
common or preferred often depends on the current market condi-
95. This proposed statute is derived from I.R.C. § 265(2). The italicized material is
supplied by the author.
96. Such a situation could occur if the company whose stock was purchased with funds
provided by debt paid no dividends. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to penal-
ize corporate acquisitions of stock funded by debt, given the provisions of § 279, see notes
68-77 supra and accompany text, unless a double benefit is provided by the interest and
dividends received deductions.
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tions. Additionally, even the theoretical distinction is arbitrary.
There are common stocks of large corporations in stable industries
that have high yields and long records of dividend payments with-
out a decrease. Corporations can view such common issues as quite
comparable to preferred stocks and, in the face of disallowance of
the interest deduction on debt funding preferred shares, could
merely shift over into the common if they wished to continue to
receive the benefits of such an investment strategy.
Fundamentally, the experience under section 265(2) indicates
that there are substantial problems in determining when the in-
debtedness has a sufficient relation to the investment to warrant
disallowance of the interest deduction. The cases under the ante-
cedents of section 265(2) 97 are divisible into two groups. First,
courts addressed the position of the municipal bond dealer who
had to borrow to finance his inventory of securities. These courts
held that there is no statutory exception to the disallowance of in-
terest on debt used to purchase or carry tax-exempt securities and
that no such exception is constitutionally mandated.9 8 Second,
courts had to determine whether particular instruments consti-
tuted tax-exempt securities within the meaning of the section
when these obligations were directly tied to indebtedness by the
taxpayer. While one court did disallow the deduction of interest on
joint-stock land bank bonds used to finance tax-exempt farmers'
notes and mortgages,"9 another allowed the interest deduction on
bank loans collateralized by state, county, and municipal defi-
ciency warrants that bore tax-exempt interest.100 These cases em-
body the first judicial struggles to ascertain what quantum of con-
nection between the debt and the tax-exempt securities was
sufficient to mandate disallowance of the interest deduction.
The period from 1954 to 1972 witnessed a rising tide of litiga-
tion on this nexus question. Leaving aside the continuing unsuc-
cessful challenge by securities dealers who had municipals in their
97. Revenue Act of 1934, § 23(b), 48 Stat. 688; Revenue Act of 1921, § 214(a)(2), 42
Stat. 239; Revenue Act of 1918, § 214(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1066-67.
98. Denman v. Slaytor, 282 U.S. 514 (1931); Clyde C. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner,
120 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1941); Prudden v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 14 (1925). For later cases
on this issue, see note 101 infra.
99. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 38 F.2d 925 (Ct. Cl. 1930), aff'd, 283 U.S. 142
(1931).
100. Sioux Falls Metal Culvert Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1324 (1932); R.B.
George Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 594 (1932). These cases turned on the court's
finding that there was no intent to carry the tax-exempt obligations and that the loans were
for the purpose of continued operation of the businesses.
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inventories,"' taxpayers made great headway during this period in
securing the formulation of judicial criteria that the government
must meet in order to establish the requisite tie between the in-
debtedness and the tax-exempt securities. The Tax Court, in three
cases disallowing the interest deduction, indicated that something
more than mere coexistence within an investor's portfolio was re-
quired.102 Dictum in a 1965 Supreme Court opinion concerning the
treatment of tax-exempt securities in determining life insurance
reserve requirements is ambiguous as to the importance of a con-
nection between the debt and the tax-exempt securities in apply-
ing section 265(2).10 In 1967 the Court of Claims took the first
step in describing the required connection, holding that there must
be a sufficiently direct relationship' as well as a forbidden tax
101. Leslie v. Commissioner, 413 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007
(1970) (reversing Tax Court holding for taxpayer under theory that municipals were too
small a portion of dealer inventory to warrant disallowance of interest deduction and requir-
ing allocation of interest among dealer's securities); Wynn v. United States, 288 F. Supp.
797 (E.D. Pa. 1968), afl'd per curiam, 411 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1008 (1970) (distinguishing the Tax Court's Leslie holding in disallowing the interest deduc-
tion); Kirchner, Moore & Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 940 (1970), af'd, 448 F.2d 1281 (10th
Cir. 1971) (rejecting taxpayer argument that purpose of debt was to allow resale within a
business cycle under the "sufficiently direct relationship" test). See also note 98 supra and
accompanying text. The case law applying § 265(2) to securities dealers was carried forward
intact into Rev. Proc. 72-18 § 5, 1972-1 C.B. 742. In the most recent case in this area, Brad-
ford v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 253 (1973), the Tax Court specifically endorsed the Second
Circuit's result in Leslie in reaching the same conclusion on indistinguishable facts. Thus,
no securities dealer has yet avoided disallowance of interest under § 265(2), even though no
direct connection between the debt and the tax-exempt security has been established.
102. Drybrough v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1029 (1964), afl'd, 376 F.2d 350 (6th Cir.
1967) (taxpayer mortgaging investment real estate and investing proceeds in tax-exempt
securities for wife); Bishop v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 154 (1963), af'd, 342 F.2d 757 (6th Cir.
1965) (taxpayer borrowing to buy securities, then selling them and buying tax-exempt secur-
ities); Jacobson v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 579 (1957) (taxpayer running loan proceeds
through bank accounts and mixing them with unborrowed money before buying tax-
exempts).
103. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice White alluded to Denman v. Slaytor, 282
U.S. 514 (1931):
It is argued, however, that the rule of Denman disallowing deduction of exempt inter-
est is limited to "but for" situations: Interest incurred on loans used to purchase ex-
empt bonds may be disallowed only where there would have been no interest charge
except for the purchase of exempt securities .... However this may be, we do not read
Denman so narrowly. We think interest can be said to be incurred or continued as a
cost of producing exempt income whenever a taxpayer borrows for the purpose of mak-
ing investments and in fact invests funds in exempt securities.
United States v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 381 U.S. 233, 248-49 n.17 (1965). Despite the ensuing
judicial activity in this area of federal tax law, the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari
to clarify the above statement.
104. Illinois Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Taxpayer
had borrowed heavily to finance its largest asset, a bridge. When the bridge was sold for
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avoidance purpose. 105 There followed a series of cases in which the
taxpayer prevailed by proving the absence of a sufficient connec-
tion to warrant disallowance. 10s Among these cases, the leading one
on the meaning of "sufficiently direct relationship" is Wisconsin
Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States.10 7 The criteria that emerged
from this case are as follows: first, whether the tax-exempts are
used as collateral; second, whether the debt finances a major non-
recurring expenditure, primarily long-term in nature; third,
whether a reasonable person would incur the debt to avoid sacrific-
ing liquidity and security; and fourth, whether business reasons are
dominant. 108 Additionally, these judicial decisions particularly em-
phasize that the government must prove the intent to receive a
double benefit and that each case demands a special factual in-
quiry rather than a mechanical application of section 265(2).109
In 1972 the Treasury Department responded to these taxpayer
successes at creating judicial criteria by issuing Revenue Procedure
72-18. Under this promulgation "direct evidence" of the forbidden
purpose is defined for "purchase" as the use of the debt proceeds
to buy the tax-exempts and for "carry" as the use of the tax-ex-
empts as collateral for the debt.110 For an individual, the general
presumption is established that a "sufficiently direct relationship"
existed unless the municipals represented less than two percent of
cash and tax-exempt securities, the cash was applied against the debt, but the tax-exempts
were not. The court found that there was a sufficient relationship between the debt and the
tax-exempts to warrant disallowance of the interest deduction.
105. The court stated the purpose test as whether "the total impression given by the
evidence leads to the conclusion that the taxpayer had the forbidden purpose." Id. at 1022-
23.
106. Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968) (tax-
payer borrowing for short-term needs of seasonal business and mortgaging a new plant while
investing earnings in municipal bonds, which were in turn used for collateral in the ensuing
season's borrowing; court allowing deduction of interest on mortgage but not on short-term
borrowing); Batten v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Va. 1971) (taxpayer borrowing
to purchase stock from uncle's estate while holding tax-exempts; court holding that "purpo-
sive connection" not established because borrowing was reasonable as part of attempt to
create an independent profitable investment); Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v.
United States, 321 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1971) (taxpayer undertaking short-term borrow-
ing to sustain operations while holding tax-exempt securities; court allowing deduction be-
cause borrowing was for valid business purpose); Ball v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1200 (1970)
(taxpayer mortgaging real estate while holding tax-exempt securities; court allowink because
there was no sufficiently direct relationship).
107. 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968).
108. See id. at 423; Ball v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1200, 1209 (1970).
109. Batten v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 629, 631-32 (E.D. Va. 1971); Norfolk Ship-
building & Drydock Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 222, 229 (E.D. Va. 1971).
110. Rev. Proc. 72-18 § 3.02-.03, 1972-1 C.B. 740-41.
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the average adjusted basis of his investment portfolio or the debt
was of a personal nature (including a home mortgage) or proceeded
from "the active conduct of a trade or business." '111 The two per-
cent test for corporations is stated in terms of average total as-
sets,'12 but a far more lenient presumption test applies to corpora-
tions: whether "it is determined that the borrowing was in excess
of business needs." '
The disparate treatment of individuals and corporations under
Revenue Procedure 72-18 has largely been reflected in the ensuing
judicial record. Corporations have been quite successful in identi-
fying business needs that justify borrowing despite the presence of
large quantities of tax-exempt securities.1 4 In contrast, individuals
have in recent years surmounted challenges under section 265(2)
only when their transactions have been structured carefully to
111. Id. at §§ 3.05, 4.02-.03, 1972-1 C.B. 741. Regarding this presumption, the revenue
procedure clearly challenged the application of the judicial standards:
Generally, a purpose to carry tax-exempt obligations will be inferred, unless rebut-
ted by other evidence, wherever the taxpayer has outstanding indebtedness which is
not directly connected with personal expenditures. . . or. . . with the active conduct
of a trade or business . . . and the taxpayer owns tax-exempt obligations. This infer-
ence will be made even though the indebtedness is ostensibly incurred or continued to
purchase or carry other portfolio investments.
Portfolio investment for the purposes of this Revenue Procedure includes transac-
tions entered into for profit (including investment in real estate) which are not con-
nected with the active conduct of a trade or business ...
A sufficiently direct relationship between the incurring or continuing of indebted-
ness and the purchasing or carrying of tax-exempt obligations will generally exist where
indebtedness is incurred to finance a new portfolio investment because the choice of
whether to finance a new portfolio investment through borrowing or through the liqui-
dation of an existing investment in tax-exempt obligations typically involves a purpose
either to maximize profit or to maintain a diversified portfolio. This purpose necessa-
rily involves a decision, whether articulated by the taxpayer or not, to incur (or con-
tinue) the indebtedness, at least in part, to purchase or carry the existing investment in
tax-exempt obligations.
Id. at § 4.04, 1972-1 C.B. 741-42.
112. Id. at § 3.05, 1972-1 C.B. 741.
113. Id. at § 6.01, 1972-1 C.B. 742-43.
114. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc. v. United States, 575 F.2d 843 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(face amount certificates necessitated by statutory requirement of "minimum certificate
reserves"); Swenson Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 686 (1975) (large contin-
gency reserve necessitated by seasonal nature of business); Handy Button Mach. Co. v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 846 (1974) (long-standing use of municipals as contingency fund jus-
tified by liquidity needs as well as purpose of being able to avoid additional borrowing). See
also Ritholz & Tanenbaum, Tax Court's Decision in Handy Button: A Hopeful Sign in the
Section 265(2) Area, 43 J. TAx. 336 (1975). Only in the blatant case of a firm that borrowed
money clearly in excess of its needs and eight months later invested the proceeds in tax-
exempts has there been a successful challenge under § 265(2) since the promulgation of Rev.
Proc. 72-18. Indian Trail Trading Post v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 497 (1973).
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minimize any connection between debt and tax-exempts. 1 5 Suc-
cessful individual plans have utilized independent investments for
which leveraging is the standard practice (real estate and life in-
surance) and have avoided use of the tax-exempts as collateral. 16
Section 265(2), which on its face applies equally to corpora-
tions and individuals, is thus used to challenge corporate interest
deductibility only in the most flagrant cases. Clearly the difference
in treatment as between individuals and corporations under Reve-
nue Procedure 72-18 reflects primarily the usual complexity of the
corporate financial structure in comparison to the financing used
by an individual. Naturally, it is easier for the government to build
a case under section 265(2) when there are fewer problems in trac-
ing the sources and uses of funds.
Just as the government has had difficulty in denying corpora-
tions the deductibility of interest on debt used to finance the ac-
quisition of tax-exempt securities, so it would likely find problems
disallowing the deductibility of interest on borrowing used to fund
high-yield equities subject to the dividends received deduction.
The same difficulties that have caused the comparatively easy pre-
sumption corporations must overcome to avoid application of sec-
tion 265(2) would be present should the government attempt to
eliminate the benefits of fully leveraging equity investments. In
fact, because of the widespread ownership of equities by corpora-
tions, the policing problem would be greater. While on its face the
use of fully leveraged equity investments would appear to run
afoul of the standards imposed under Revenue Procedure 72-
18-borrowing in excess of business needs-it is quite conceivable
that practitioners could construct arguments concerning liquidity
115. McDonough v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1978) (requiring more justi-
fication on taxpayer's part than desire to maintain both taxable and tax-exempt securities in
a portfolio and to maximize use of money invested in the taxable securities in order to
overcome presumption); Phipps v. United States, 515 F.2d 1099 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (disallowing
interest deduction on bank loans to partnership collateralized by partner's tax-exempts);
Mariorenzi v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 681 (1973), aff'd per curiam, 490 F.2d 92 (1st
Cir. 1974) (disallowing interest deduction on home mortgage when proceeds used to buy
municipals). See generally Willis & Raabe, Avoiding Disallowed Interest Deduction for
Taxpayer Holding Tax-Exempt Bonds, 56 TAXES 230 (1978); Note, The Deductibility of
Interest Costs by a Taxpayer Holding Tax-Exempt Obligations: A Neutral Principle of
Allocation, 61 VA. L. REv. 211 (1975).
116. Levitt v. United States, 517 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1975) (but interest on borrowings
to buy Treasury Bills for estate tax reduction disallowed when tax-exempts exceeded
amount of such borrowing); Israelson v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Md. 1973),
afl'd mem., 508 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1974) (but interest on bank loans used to purchase taxa-
ble securities held not deductible because taxpayer refrained from selling tax-exempts).
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and contingency funds that would be analogous to those that have
prevailed against section 265(2) challenges.11 7
IV. CONCLUSION
By borrowing money and purchasing preferred stocks with an
average yield greater than 58% of the interest rate on the debt, a
corporation at the maximum marginal tax rate can reduce its fed-
eral income tax liability. In evaluating the potential benefit of this
practice, the corporation must consider transactions costs and its
ability either to tie the debt to the equities or to have a sufficiently
distant maturity on the debt to weather interest rate cycles that
depress preferred stock prices. A small to medium-sized corpora-
tion probably is in a better position to obtain appropriate debt and
to purchase enough equities, without depressing yields, to make
the use of fully leveraged equity investments have a significant im-
pact on its tax liability. A corporation would also have to assess the
chances that the dividends would cause personal holding company
tax liability in periods of low operating earnings. In securing the
loans, the corporation would have to avert the danger that interest
deductions might be disallowed under tax rules pertaining to re-
lated parties, capital structure, and debt-financed corporate acqui-
sitions. An analysis of the past application of the interest deduc-
tion disallowance provision relating to the holding of tax-exempt
securities indicates that the government would have difficulty in
creating and applying to corporations an interest disallowance pro-
vision when high-yield equities, rather than tax-exempts, are re-
lated to the debt.
THOMAS D. MOORE, JR.
117. See note 113 supra.
[Vol. 33:14231450
